Patriotic Fun: Toys and Mobilization in China from the Republican to the Communist Era by Boretti, Valentina
1Patriotic Fun: Toys andMobilization in China from the
Republican to the Communist Era
Valentina Boretti
To celebrate Children’s Day in 1932, Chinese boys and girls were encour-
aged to participate in a target-shooting competition. They were to try to
pick off Japanese planes, tanks, and warships with bow and arrow, pop-
guns, and balls. In 1951, the time had come to play “Executing the War
Criminals”; with toy riﬂes or bows, children could take aim at targets with
images of Chiang Kai-shek and Harry Truman.1
The use of politicized leisure to mobilize children is pervasive through-
out the world, but its expressions in pre-Cultural Revolution China have
attracted little attention so far. Focusing on prescribed leisure, this chapter
traces a preliminary genealogy of play-training for activism in China and
comments on youngsters’ reactions. Looking at the deployment of toys to
mobilize children from the 1910s to the early 1950s, it investigates the
ways in which different regimes employed play and playthings as instru-
ments to foster engagement in struggles of a political, commercial, or
military nature.
Although it cannot be assumed that children followed the script closely,
a study of how leisure was framed offers insights into notions of nation-
hood and ideal personhood. It can also provide a perspective on cultural
continuities between the Republican and Communist eras, such as con-
stant mobilization and normative opposition to nonpurposeful leisure.
Examining the function of toys as instruments of mobilization highlights,
1 Qian Gengzin, ed., “Ershiyi nian ertong jie huodong baogao (er xu),” Zhejiang minzhong
jiaoyu 3 (1932), 47–52; Chen Heqin and Wu Chengqi, “Qiangbi zhanfan,” Xin ertong
jiaoyu 6(11) (1951), 31.
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moreover, a range of porous boundaries: between toy and tool, fun and
seriousness, child and adult, aggression and defense, peace and war.
In both Republican and Communist China, toys were employed to
instruct children in what to do and what to be: to make them physically
and morally healthy, curious about science, creatively productive, and
militant, which did not necessarily signify militarized but rather com-
mitted to rallying for the nation. Militancy – or, perhaps more accurately,
activism – hadmore to dowith patriotic awareness and preparedness than
warlike aggressiveness, although militaristic attitudes might emerge.
Against the backdrop of recurring calls for assertive self-defense against
actual or perceived besiegement, children were urged to cultivate non-
puerility and participative responsibility. Crucial to this agenda was
a discourse of mobilization, formulated by intellectuals, pedagogues,
ideologues, and public ofﬁcials – in short, the experts – and disseminated
to urban and rural children, parents, and educators through publications,
classroom instruction, and events or campaigns. With its reiteration of
tropes and prescriptions that varied only slightly over the decades from
one regime to the next, this discourse amounted to a choral enterprise, and
it is as such that we shall explore it, rather than focusing on solo voices.
leisure and the martial spirit for the republican
new citizens
At the turn of the twentieth century, following several defeats and per-
ceived humiliations, the fear was widespread in China that “extinction” –
to use the evolutionary terminology then in vogue – was near. “Survival”
would depend upon renewal. Like their counterparts in other countries,
Chinese reformers maintained that national revival ought to start with
children.2
This putative discovery of children as present and prospective “new”
citizens located them in opposition to a (mostly imagined) tradition,
construed as oblivious to the peculiarities of childhood and condemned
as unable to produce “useful” citizens. Although some, like artist Feng
Zikai or writer Lu Xun, did plead for the need to appreciate youngsters as
2 Carl Ipsen, Italy in the Age of Pinocchio: Children and Danger in the Liberal Era
(New York, 2006); Mark A. Jones, Children as Treasures: Childhood and the Middle
Class in Early Twentieth Century Japan (Cambridge, MA, 2010). On China, see Andrew
F. Jones, “The Child as History in Republican China: A Discourse on Development,”
positions 10(3) (2002), 695–727.
18 Valentina Boretti
such, the dominant discourse, especially from the late 1920s onward,
remained focused on the value of children to national rejuvenation. New
children had to be self-reliant, robust, industrious, well educated, and
aware of their responsibility to the nation: Youthfulness was no excuse for
eschewing duty.3 Because properly nurturing these crucial assets was vital,
no aspect of children’s lives escaped the interference of experts, who
tended to accuse parents of incompetence.
Leisure became a seriousmatter. Play and toyswere discursively recast as
tools for nation- and citizen-building because of their capacity to uncon-
sciously train and mold young citizens from infancy. Determination, cour-
age, patriotism, creativity, and cooperativeness could all be fostered
through play, if it were properly guided and if suitable toys were used.4
In line with the claim that only now were children’s inclinations appre-
ciated, playthings were proclaimed a necessity and declared to be extremely
inﬂuential. “Appropriate” toys, capable of producing the new child, should
be not merely entertaining. Chinese experts, like their counterparts else-
where, did not approve of amusement that served no discernible purpose.5
Rather, playthings had to be educational and to help cultivate body and
spirit, fostering qualities like love for science, manual inventiveness, and
a martial spirit.6
Indeed, particular importance was attached to martial spirit. In 1935,
the Shanghai News Child’s Companion informed young readers that the
unﬂattering “sick man of East Asia” sobriquet attributed to China was
3 Liang Qichao, “Lun youxue” (1897), in Wu Song, et al., eds., Yinbingshi wenji dianjiao
(Kunming, 2001), vol. I, 47–57; Lu Xun, “What Is Required of Us as Fathers Today”
(1919), in LuXun, SelectedWorks (Beijing, 1980), vol. II, 56–71; Xian Baiyan, “Ertong de
shehuihua,” Funü zazhi 8(2) (1922), 23–27; Song Jie, “Ertong jiuji wenti,” Dongfang
zazhi 22(17) (1925), 50–69; Feng Zikai, “Ertong de darenhua,” Jiaoyu zazhi 19(7 and 8)
(1927), 1–3; Pan Shu, “Zenyang zuo yige yingfu guonan de ertong,” Xiao xuesheng 5(5)
(1935), 1–6; Zhang Yucai, “Xiandai jiating yu ertong jiaoyang,” Dongfang zazhi 32(11)
(1935), 91–97.
4 Shen Buzhou, “Lun youyi,” Jiaoyu zazhi 4(12) (1912), 215–27; Xi Zhen, “Rensheng zhi
genben jiaoyu,” Funü zazhi 3(8) (1917), 4–10; Chen Heqin, “Ertong xinli ji jiaoyu ertong
zhi fangfa,” Xin jiaoyu 3(2) (1920), 140–46; Chen Yongsheng, Wan yu chi (Shanghai,
1931).
5 Gary Cross, Kids’ Stuff: Toys and the Changing World of American Childhood
(Cambridge, MA, 1997), ch. 5; Catriona Kelly, Children’s World: Growing Up in Russia
1890–1991 (New Haven, 2007), 125–26.
6 Xu Fuyan, “Wanju yu youzhi jiaoyu zhi guanxi,” Funü shibao 9 (1913), 24–27;
Wei Shouyong, “Ertong wanju wenti,” Funü zazhi 3(8) (1917), 4–6; Wang Muqing,
“Ertong wanju de yanjiu,” Zhonghua jiaoyu jie 16(7) (1927), 1–3; Chen Jiyun, Wanju
yu jiaoyu (Shanghai, 1933); Qing Shan, “Ertong wanju jianghua: wanju shi yizhong
zhongyao de jiaoyu gongju,” Xiandai fumu 1(8) (1933), 28–29.
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due to the weakness of its people, which had been caused by the respect
traditionally enjoyed by literati to the detriment of military men. This had
induced disdain for physical exercise, but the “weak” were to be “elimi-
nated.” A martial spirit was, therefore, indispensable if China was to
“survive” and end its “humiliation.”7
This discourse of martial spirit and physical robustness had originated
well before the establishment of the Republic in 1912. It dated back to the
late nineteenth century, when intellectuals – Liang Qichao being the most
inﬂuential – had declared the Chinese and China to be unﬁt. Overlooking
the importance of martial culture in the Qing empire as well as the fact
that Chinese models of masculinity encompassed both literary ability and
martial prowess,8 reformers maintained that the prominence accorded to
the former had begotten physical and spiritual weaklings. Liang advo-
cated respect formartial qualities, which, he claimed, China had possessed
in antiquity and ought to recover in order to avoid perishing.9 This
discourse echoed a much earlier tradition of blaming defeat on ﬂawed
masculinity.10 It also possibly contained a measure of self-orientalization,
that is, the reproduction of Euro-American constructs of “theOriental” as
effeminate and incompetent.11 Although healthier empires like Britain
also experienced apprehension over masculinity at this time, Chinese
anxieties reﬂected a substantial national crisis.12 Allegedly inept men
and “crippled” women unable to raise vigorous offspring13 had to be
7 Guo Pinjuan, “Shangwu jingshen,” in Shenbao ertong zhoukan she, ed., Shenbao ertong
zhi you (Shanghai, 1935), vol. I, 15–16.
8 Joanna Waley-Cohen, “Militarization of Culture in Eighteenth-Century China,” in
Nicola Di Cosmo, ed., Military Culture in Imperial China (Cambridge, MA, 2009),
278–95; Kam Louie, Theorising Chinese Masculinity: Society and Gender in China
(Cambridge, 2002).
9 Liang Qichao, “Lun shangwu” (1903), in Yinbingshi wenji dianjiao, vol. I, 615–21;
James R. Pusey, China and Charles Darwin (Cambridge, MA, 1983), 260–73;
Colin Green, “Turning Bad Iron into Polished Steel: Whampoa and the Rehabilitation
of the Chinese Soldier,” in James Flath and Norman Smith, eds., Beyond Suffering:
Recounting War in Modern China (Vancouver, 2011), 156–57.
10 Martin W. Huang, Negotiating Masculinities in Late Imperial China (Honolulu, 2006),
ch. 4.
11 Song Geng, The Fragile Scholar: Power andMasculinity in Chinese Culture (Hong Kong,
2004), 9.
12 Stephanie Olsen, Juvenile Nation: Youth, Emotions and the Making of the Modern
British Citizen, 1880–1914 (London, 2014).
13 Liang Qichao, “On Women’s Education” (1897), in Lydia H. Liu, Rebecca E. Karl, and
Dorothy Ko, eds., The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational
Theory (New York, 2013), 189–203.
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replaced by robust new citizens,14whowere to cultivate a martial spirit or
outlook.15
Fostering a martial spirit in children was meant to induce not militarism
but rather physico-spiritual strength, unity, and the ability to mobilize in
order to defend and reshape China, culturally, politically, militarily, and
commercially. Beginning in the early Republican years, military toys were
employed to help nurture a martial spirit so as to create citizens poised to ﬁt
into the modern world while infused with the spirit of a heroic past. In the
1910s and early 1920s, pedagogues praised swords and spears as testimonies
to ancient soldierly virtues and commended toy soldiers, warships, and ﬁre-
arms as educational because they cultivated imagination, knowledge, aware-
ness of the military, and a martial spirit.16 Even foreign toys, like the
American-made Daisy Air Riﬂe, were advertised in 1920 as tools to cultivate
boys’ “indispensable”martial spirit and to turn China into a strong nation.17
The appreciation of military playthings was not universal in China
before the late 1920s, however, probably because of the association of
military iconography with ravaging warlord armies.18 Indeed, journalists
expressed misgivings about promoting toy soldiers in educational exhibi-
tions, and the widely read Ladies’ Journal warned mothers that military
toys could give a misleading impression of war as “fun” and also encou-
rage destructiveness.19 Children themselves showed mixed reactions.
Some boys and girls did apparently enjoy playing with air pistols, arran-
ging toy soldiers against fantasy enemies, and engaging in play battles
with friends,20 but surveys also revealed that some children ignored or
14 Andrew D. Morris, Marrow of the Nation: A History of Sport and Physical Culture in
Republican China (Berkeley, 2004).
15 Paul J. Bailey, Gender and Education in China: Gender Discourses and Women’s
Schooling in the Early Twentieth Century (Abingdon, 2007), 98; Nicolas Schillinger,
The Body and Military Masculinity in Late Qing and Early Republican China (Lanham,
MD, 2016), ch. 6.
16 Bao Qiong, “Ertong yu wanju zhi guanxi,” Zhonghua funü jie 1(9) (1915), 6–7;
Jia Fengzhen, “Jiaoyu shang zhi wanju guan,” Jiaoyu zazhi 11(5) (1919), 33, 36, and
11(6) (1919), 45; Jiaoyu bu putong jiaoyu si, ed., Ertong wanju shencha baogao (Beijing,
1922), 18, 34, and list of toys: 3, 7, 18, 60–61; “Ertong wanju shencha baogao biao,”Xin
jiaoyu 7(5) (1923), 447–48, 452, 461.
17 Dongfang zazhi 171(8) (1920), n.p.
18 Arthur Waldron, “The Warlord: Twentieth-Century Chinese Understandings of
Violence, Militarism, and Imperialism,” American Historical Review 96 (1991),
1073–1100.
19 “Kaimu hou Xinwenbao zhi jizai,” Xin jiaoyu 9(5) (1924), 961; Jing Xun, “Ertong de
youxi ji wanju,” Funü zazhi 9(4) (1923), 123.
20 Hua Zheru, “Wo zhi youtong shidai,” Shaonian zazhi 8(3) (1918), 9–11; Chow Chung-
cheng, The Lotus Pool of Memory (London, 1961), 22; Hsieh Ping-ying, Girl Rebel:
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disliked toy weapons.21 Children’s magazines sometimes featured covers
portraying boys (and, very occasionally, girls) playing with toy weapons,
and drawings or photographs of guns sent by boys; sometimes they ran
stories that deplored the “cruelty” of airguns or associated them with
“homicidal battlegrounds.”22
Attitudes began to change in the late 1920s after the Nationalist Party
(GMD) gained nominal control of most of China and increasingly pro-
moted militant – even militarized – nationalism. The Japanese seizure of
Manchuria in 1931, followed by outright war in 1937, predictably rein-
forced the discourse ofmartial mobilization.With rare exceptions, such as
Feng Zikai,23 experts spoke approvingly of military toys, which fre-
quently appeared in publications.
Children’s periodicals praised cultivated yet martial boys who bravely
trained to protect the nation. Previously anti-military authors penned
stories that urged boys to “polish riﬂes and sharpen swords.” Student
poems sang of fearless resistance and willingness to shed blood for
China.24 Picture cards showed boys “studying military drills” as they
played with their toy armaments on the lounge carpet.25 While mention-
ing the potentially harmful effects of warlike games, texts for educators
and parents argued that toy weapons could instill a “valiant” spirit along
with initiative and attention.26 According to experts, the Chinese lacked
resoluteness, which ought to be cultivated from infancy. This may have
been why kindergartens, before and after the war, were supposed to be
equipped with military toys: Playing with bows and arrows or swords
The Autobiography of Hsieh Pingying (New York, [1940] 1975), 19; N. T. Wang,
My Nine Lives (San Jose, 2001), 6; Yang Xianyi, White Tiger: An Autobiography of
Yang Xianyi (Hong Kong, 2002), 8.
21 Su Yishi xiao, “Jiangsu Yishi fuxiao di’er jie ertong wanju zhanlanhui jingguo baogao,”
Jiaoyu zazhi 14(4) (1922), 6–12; Zhang Jiuru, “Jiangsu Jiushi fuxiao ertong wanju ceyan
baogao,” Jiaoyu zazhi 14(8) (1922), 1–2, 9.
22 See photographs in Ertong shijie 8(1)3 (1923), n.p.; Ertong shijie 18(20) (1926), n.p.;
drawing by Chen Zhaoyu, “Qiqiang,” Ertong shijie 14(1) (1925), n.p.; and stories by
Zhuodai, “Qiqiang yu kouqin,” Ertong shijie 12(10) (1924), 3–11; Boyou, “Wan,”Xiao
pengyou 157 (1925), 34.
23 Feng Chenbao and Feng Yiyin, eds., Feng Zikai manhua quanji: ertong xiang juan
(Beijing, 1999), vol. II, 172.
24 Yu Cheng, “Aiguo nan’er,” Ertong shijie 22(3) (1928), 2; Boyou, “Wuzhuang qilai,”
Xiao pengyou 553 (1933), 26; Zhang Ruxiu, “Zhonghua nan’er,” Xiao xuesheng 7(3)
(1937), 42–43.
25 Erge huapian (Shanghai, 1930s), vol. I, series 4, n.p.
26 Chen Jiyun, Wanju yu jiaoyu, 72; Yu Jifan, Wanju yu jiaoyu (Shanghai, 1933), 29, 50;
Wang Guoyuan, comp.,Wanju jiaoyu (Shanghai, 1933), 6, 24.
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would “cultivate a martial spirit,” and riding hobby-horses would pro-
mote bravery in boys.27 Revising his earlier views, the inﬂuential pedago-
gue Chen Heqin afﬁrmed that a good toy “must arouse children’s martial
spirit,” and he approved of toy guns, cannons, and warships for fostering
courageous and soldierly attitudes.28
The discourse on martial spirit centered on “children” and on boys
speciﬁcally when toy weapons were involved. Its iconography featured
boys predominantly. Girls were occasionally mentioned in connection
with war toys and games, however, and they did engage in military play.
Like the image of the ideal child, mobilization was coded as masculine but
was nonetheless intended for both genders.29 Military toys may not have
been speciﬁcally recommended for girls, but the brave-cum-patriotic-cum
-scientiﬁc attitude that informed the narrative of mobilization and martial
spirit was. And so was anti-imperialist activism.
toys and anti-imperialist mobilization
If toy-centered mobilization had focused mainly on the inner cultivation
of courage and martial spirit before the early 1930s, it came to encompass
external fronts as well – both commercial and military – during the 1930s
and early 1940s. As the periodical Children’s World instructed its young
readers in 1933, national goods and national defense were the means to
repel “the imperialists” who intended to “carve up” China.30 Girls and
boys were thus asked to protect China and their own Chinese-ness by
mobilizing against two foreign armies: the toy army of imported play-
things and the real army of Japanese invaders.
In China, as elsewhere,31 foreign playthings had in fact long been seen
as symbols and spearheads of economic and, above all, cultural
encroachment. To cite but a few examples, already in 1912 the
Industrial Magazine of China was arguing that imported toy soldiers
27 Chen Heqin, “Youzhiyuan zhi shebei,” Jiaoyu zazhi 19(2) (1927), 7–8; Su Wanfu, ed.,
Youzhiyuan de shebei (Shanghai, 1935), 19, 99, 131–32; Zou Dehui, comp., Youzhiyuan
de youxi (Shanghai, 1937), 11–12; Wan Qiyu, Zenyang banli youzhi jiaoyu (Shanghai,
1947), 7.
28 Chen Heqin, “Wanju” (1925) and “Ertong wanju yu jiaoyu” (1939), inWanju yu jiaoyu
(Kunming, 1991), 36–37 and 108–09.
29 As seen, for instance, in the Girl Scouts: Margaret Mih Tillman, “Engendering Children
of the Resistance: Models for Gender and Scouting in China, 1919–1937,” Cross-
Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review (e-journal) 13 (2014), 134–73.
30 Lianghuan, “Guofang moxing zhizuo fa,” Ertong shijie 30(1) (1933), 22–23.
31 Michel Manson, Jouets de toujours: de l’Antiquité à la Révolution (Paris, 2001), 323–24.
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sporting the ﬂags of both the country of manufacture and China laud-
ably cultivated a martial spirit but at the same time caused harm because
they might encourage love for two ﬂags or two countries. In 1926, the
prominent pedagogue Zhang Zonglin deplored the predominance of
foreign toys in kindergartens, expressing concern about their potential
impact on the Chinese-ness of children.32 Although experts reviled
Chinese toys old and new, they repeatedly – but unsuccessfully – urged
consumers to buy patriotically.
The crusade for national toys reached a climax after the invasion of
Manchuria as Japanese toys became the main target of hostility.
Children were reminded not only that opposing “enemy goods” was
among their social duties33 but also that they must not fund foreigners,
as the Japanese were using the proﬁts they earned from exporting toys
to annihilate the Chinese. Children penned stories in which boys,
patriotically instructed by their teachers, supervised their younger
brothers’ acquisitions, while girls rectiﬁed their mothers’ negligent
purchases by resolutely exposing dishonest toy sellers. Youngsters
were also encouraged to urge their parents to carefully check where
toys were made before making a purchase.34 Vigilant (adultiﬁed)
children were thus to police (infantilized) adults, including their own
parents. Mobilization also involved manual work: Youngsters were
urged to realize that toys could “sell the nation,” to stop depending
on foreign ingenuity (for Japanese imports were, in fact, still consider-
able), and instead to use their brains and hands to invent new toys for
themselves and for China.35
Children unable to make their own toys could purchase playthings
manufactured locally. Indeed, patriotismwas used in advertising Chinese-
made toys. Tanks could “arouse national consciousness.” Tank-shaped
candy purportedly capable of “cultivat[ing] children to be militant
32 Li Wenquan, “Shuo wanju,” Zhongguo shiye zazhi 5 (1912), 15–16; Zhang Zonglin,
“Diaocha Jiang Zhe youzhi jiaoyu hou de ganxiang,”Zhonghua jiaoyu jie 15(12) (1926),
2; Xu Yasheng, “Ertong wanju de yanjiu,” Funü zazhi 15(5) (1929), 16; Susan
R. Fernsebner, “A People’s Playthings: Toys, Childhood, and Chinese Identity,
1909–1933,” Postcolonial Studies 6(3) (2003), 282–85.
33 Zhu Yanfu, Ertong jie (Shanghai, 1936), 22.
34 ZhouHui, “Yangwawa,”Ertong shijie 30(11) (1933), 96–98;Wei Suzhen, “Gege he didi
mai wanju,” Xiao pengyou 595 (1934), 42–43; Jinxi, “Wanju jinkou he zizhi wanju,” in
Shenbao ertong zhoukan she, ed., Shenbao ertong zhi you, vol. I, 51.
35 Dujuan, “Ertong he wanju”; Naichang, “Wanju keyi mai guo,” in Shenbao ertong
zhoukan she, ed., Shenbao ertong zhi you, vol. I, 39, 53.
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citizens” prompted one boy to proclaim that he would use it to ﬁght the
enemy.36
Opposing a real foreign army became imperative in the 1930s and
1940s, and, as in Europe, toys were used to familiarize children with
war.37 New patterns for time-honoured tangram puzzles reproduced
“modern weapons of war” like tanks and anti-aircraft guns. Kindergarten
children, it was suggested, could use building blocks to make warships and
armoured vehicles, and anti-Japanese “patriotic games” were designed for
elementary schools.38 The magazineModern Children offered instructions
and drawings for a puzzle featuring the collaborationist politician Wang
Jingwei, his wife, and “a Japanese thief”: The pieces could be recombined to
make “many amusing monster ﬁgures,” thereby ridiculing the enemy.39
Texts offered instruction not only on how to fashion toy animals and
ﬁgurines, but also on how to make cannons, crafted from thread spools
and bamboo, and radish bombs.40
Possibly the most signiﬁcant aspect of this call to miniature arms was
the emergence in the mid 1930s of “national defense toys” (a term also
used in the United States during World War II)41 and, shortly afterward,
of “war of resistance toys” (“war of resistance” was the term used for
the Second Sino-JapaneseWar). These new discursive tags turned military
playthings into training tools with little ludic signiﬁcance. Some children
did in fact assert that, with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the time
for recreation was over, which dovetailed with adult invitations to “put
toys down” and to focus on trying to support the nation in danger.42
Children were apparently to relinquish play and move on to reproducing
36 China Can advertisement in Yong’an yuekan 1 (1939), n.p.; Guanshengyuan advertise-
ment in Xiandai fumu 1(1) (1933), n.p.; Lien Ling-ling, “From the Retailing Revolution
to the Consumer Revolution: Department Stores in Modern Shanghai,” Frontiers of
History in China 4(3) (2009), 379.
37 Antonio Gibelli, Il popolo bambino. Infanzia e nazione dalla Grande Guerra a Salò
(Turin, 2005).
38 Yuesheng, “Qiqiao xin tu,” Ertong shijie 30(6) (1933), 51; Shen Baiying, et al., comp.,
Youzhiyuan gongzuo yibailiushi zu (Changsha, [1936] 1939), 52, 302; Morris,Marrow
of the Nation, 133.
39 Yang Wuzai, “Xiao wanyi,” Xiandai ertong 5(5) (1942), 9.
40 Lin Lübin, Ertong shougong (Shanghai, 1933), vol. III, 167–68; Lei Jiaxian, Guoshi
wanju zhizuo fa (Shanghai, 1937), 51.
41 Lisa L. Ossian, The Forgotten Generation: American Children and World War II
(Columbia, MO, 2011), 56.
42 Liu Huanming, “Shei he wo wan,” Xiao pengyou 553 (1933), 41; Boyou and Xiyi,
“Ertong nian de nuli,” Xiao pengyou 666 (1935), 12; Sun Jie and Ming Min, “Shidai
xiao xianfeng,” Kangzhan ertong 2(1/2) (1940), n.p.
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combat: Youthfulness may have shielded them from the battleﬁeld but not
from becoming acquainted with war. The Chinese may have been inher-
ently peaceable, as textbooks argued, but the nation had to be protected.43
Children’s periodicals, primary school handicraft textbooks, andmate-
rials for educators all addressed the issue of “defense training” or “war of
resistance education,” offering a playful introduction to arms. Some
advocates of defense training did concede that weapons were used to kill
but argued that reproducing them was crucial in helping children acquire
the military knowledge needed to resist the foreign invasion. Detailed
explanations were therefore provided on how to construct a wide array
of military apparatus – from aircraft carriers and gas masks to machine-
guns and anti-aircraft artillery – out of scrap or other easily obtainable
materials; these toys were sometimes referred to as “defense models” or
even “teaching material.”44 Throughout unoccupied China, schoolchil-
dren engaged in these modeling activities and had their achievements duly
appraised and ranked.45Reproduction was also understood as the spring-
board to future invention: Toy- or model-making initiated children into
labor, resourcefulness, technology, and warfare simultaneously.
In China, as in other theaters of war, basic knowledge of aviation was
considered necessary to resist aggression. Thus, for example, kindergarten
teachers in rural areas fashioned airplanes out of cigarette packets to
introduce their young students to aviation. According to children’s maga-
zines, constructing toy airplanes would help train the young to defend
China against its imperialist enemies.46 However, a survey conducted in
the mid 1930s found that few children in the countryside liked toy planes,
to the disappointment of some commentators. Interest in “national
defense education” toys like airplanes was imperative, they argued:
43 Peter Zarrow, Educating China: Knowledge, Society, and Textbooks in a Modernizing
World, 1902–1937 (Cambridge, 2015), 68, 127.
44 Lianghuan, “Guofang moxing zhizuo fa”; Zong Lianghuan, Junxie moxing zhizuo fa
(Shanghai, 1933); Xu Jian’an and Yao Jiadong, eds., Guofang xunlian xiaoxue gongyi
jiaocai (Shanghai, 1936); Wu Ding, “Kangzhan shiqi xiaoxue kecheng ji jiaocai zhi
yanjiu,” Jiaoyu zazhi 28(5) (1938), 43; Rui Xuanzhi, “Xiaoxue kangzhan jiaocai yi
shu,” Jiaoyu zazhi 28(6) (1938), 33; Jiang Xiangnan, “Kangzhan wanju,”Xiandai ertong
6(4) (1942), 136–38. On the mobilization of orphans in wartime, see M. Colette Plum,
“Lost Childhoods in a New China: Child-Citizen-Workers at War, 1937–1945,”
European Journal of East Asian Studies 11 (2012), 237–58.
45
“Quanguo xiaoxue chuzhong xuesheng zizhi feiji gaoshepao moxing chengji pingpan
biao,” Guangxi sheng zhengfu gongbao 1138 (1941), 7–11.
46 Sun Mingxun, Laogong you’er tuan (Shanghai, 1935), 153; Shenzi, “Feiji,” Xiao pen-
gyou 754 (1937), 23–25; Jiang Xiangnan, “Kangzhan wanju,” Xiandai ertong 6(3)
(1942), 100–02.
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The absence of such interest could only be the result of unfamiliarity and
could thus be easily remedied by encouraging aeromodeling in handicraft
classes.47 One suspects that children might sometimes have seen – and
despised – making “defense toys” as homework, on account of their
connection to school- and state-promoted activities.
Nonetheless, some youngsters did echo the association between toys
and defense. One boy voiced regret that he was too small to kill the
enemies with his airgun, for example. Some used improvised corncob
“bombs” to play at bombing the Japanese.48Other boys, however, simply
played war games out in the street or made their own toy pistols, water-
guns, and broadswords, displaying perhaps a martial spirit but not neces-
sarily militant defense-mindedness.49Military toys, toy-making, and play
did not inevitably entail a conscious acceptance of the full anti-imperialist
mobilization package, and of course toy-making was, to many, simply
a necessity. Raising their “national consciousness” might, indeed, not
have been the main reason why children engaged in play.
leisure for the “successors to the revolution”
Internal military conﬂict might have come to an end in China by late 1949,
but mobilization did not. Although the Communists claimed to be radi-
cally different from the Nationalists, their early 1950s discourse of child-
hood and play was rather similar to that of their predecessors, albeit with
more emphasis on the collective and more extensive politicization and
regimentation. Texts for educators and children’s magazines disseminated
the message that the young, as “successors” to a valiant cause, had to
cultivate themselves to be “new” and “useful” people who would be able
to construct and protect the motherland. Even more markedly than
before, mere amusement was despised in favor of purposeful leisure:
A “befuddled life”50 was no longer tolerable.51 If grown-ups were
47 Luo Zixin and Wang Zhilu, “Xiaoxue ertong xingqu de diaocha yanjiu,” Jiaoyu
zazhi 26(8) (1936), 76.
48 Yang Yijing, “Qiqiang,” Xiao pengyou 555 (1933), 38; Henrietta Harrison, The Man
Awakened from Dreams: One Man’s Life in a North China Village, 1857–1942
(Stanford, 2005), 162.
49 Zhu Caipei, “Xinnian de youxi,” Xiao pengyou 444 (1931), 69; Wang Meng, Wang
Meng zizhuan. Diyibu, bansheng duoshi (Canton, 2006), 45; Fu Zhengyi, Jianji rensheng:
Fu Zhengyi zizhuan (Beijing, 2007), 6.
50 Fang Jianming, “Qingzhu liu yi ertong jie,” Xin ertong shijie 45 (1950), 6.
51 Fang Yuyan, “Liangge shijie de ertong shenghuo,” Renmin jiaoyu 2 (1950), 27–30;
Zhang Guofan, “Yinggai lizhi zuo ge xin ertong,”Xin ertong 28 (1950), 2; Che Xiangchen,
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infantilized and the young made adult in the People’s Republic, as Jean-
Pierre Diény rightly argued,52 this was only an intensiﬁcation of
Republican attitudes.
Like their precursors, the Communists looked upon play as an educa-
tional tool. Play was supposed to teach children love of labor, collecti-
vism, tenacity, discipline, and politeness.53Andmobilization. Parents and
educators were repeatedly advised to guide and supervise play, albeit
without stiﬂing children’s creativity. Creativity was to be rechanneled,
however, if it went in the wrong direction. Around 1950, for example,
some primary school children in Beijing who had wanted to be the
Americans in a play battle because they considered them to be more
vigorous than their opponents were set straight by means of thorough
“current affairs education” about the Korean War. Military games with
toy weapons were ﬁne for cultivating courage, vigilance, and hatred of
imperialism, but only when carried out according to the script.54 Posing as
a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldier or as a volunteer ﬁghter against
“American devils” in Korea was laudable, but impersonating “evil char-
acters” could allegedly result in children taking on their bad ways. Bad
characters could, however, be impersonated on occasion for reasons of
expedience. For example, one player in “Cooperation Between the Army
and the People,” a game recommended for primary schools in 1949, was
to take on the role of Chiang Kai-shek.55
Whether deﬁned as children’s “closest friends” or “tools to educate
children,” playthings remained catalysts of mobilization under the
Communists, but increasingly in conjunction with “meaningful” group
activities such as toy-making and collective play. Children were in fact
soon expected to make toys rather than simply play with them like
toddlers. Experts claimed that, in contrast to the previous regime’s
“Haohao xuexi, jianshe zuguo,” Hao haizi 81 (1953), 1; “Xingfu de xia yidai,” Renmin
huabao 6 (1954), 4–7; Zhongguo fulihui shaonian gong, “Shanghai shaonian gong gongzuo
jingyan,” Renmin jiaoyu 6 (1956), 48–51.
52 Jean-Pierre Diény, Le monde est à vous. La Chine et les livres pour enfants (Paris, 1971),
7.
53 Zhong Zhaohua, “Zenyang jiao xiao haizi youxi,”Xin ertong jiaoyu 7(5) (1951), 16–17;
Ya Su, “Xuexi Sulian dui you’er jiaoyu de fangfa,” Xin Zhongguo funü 6 (1953), 12.
54 Chen Dingxiu, “Jieshao ‘ertong leyuan,’”Xin jiaoyu 2(6) (1951), 37; “Jieshao Beijing shi
shaonian ertong dui de shishi jiaoyu huodong,” Renmin Ribao (1951), in Jiaoyu ziliao
congkan she, ed., Xiao xuexiao de shaonian ertong dui (Shanghai, 1951), 80–83.
55 Zhong Zhaohua, “Zenyang jiao xiao haizi youxi,” 16; Lüda shi minzhu funü lianhehui
fuli bu, ed., Zenyang jiaoyu haizi (Dalian, 1953), 37; Kou Xiulan, “Youxi,” Xin
Zhongguo funü 1 (1955), 21; Xiao xuesheng chang you ji (Shexian, Henan, 1949), 37.
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negligence, the government was now ensuring that all children had “new”
and “appropriate” toys. Again, a good plaything should instruct, and
foster a love of labor or an interest in science. Although some educators
argued that dolls ought to look Chinese, the struggle against foreign toys
subsided, most likely because the few available items hailed from socialist
countries.56
Toy-related mobilization in the early 1950s could involve volunteer-
ism, as when primary school children (were) rushed to create playthings
for hastily established kindergartens. Or it could involve manual-
intellectual mobilization, as when home- or school-made toy replicas of
machines – deﬁned as “models” – were held up as examples of children’s
engagement with science and technology, and of their eagerness to learn
the productive skills needed to rebuild and protect China.57 And, despite
the fact that the martial spirit was no longer mentioned, toys could be
instruments of martial mobilization for political and quasi-military strug-
gle. In all its facets, the discourse of activism tended to address “chil-
dren” – yet it was still a masculine-coded model that girls had to pursue.
toys as agitation tools: between tanks and doves
Chinese children had to learn to be concerned with political affairs; they
should be “always prepared.”58 In the early 1950s, the Taiwan question
and the Korean War offered opportunities for them to (im)prove their
preparation. Mobilization was promoted mainly through toy- or model-
making, in a happy blend of creative labor, frugal resourcefulness, and
political education. In such activities, youngsters were expected to display
a remarkable fervor that reﬂected the intense gratitude they presumably
felt for enjoying such happy lives. As in the Republican era, the mobiliza-
tion of children involved ridiculing enemies and training to defeat them as
well as the acquisition of basic scientiﬁc-technological skills.
56 Fu Baochen, ed., Ertong wanju zhanlan jiniance (Chengdu, 1950); Beijing shi gongshang
guanli ju, “Benju guanyu zhaokai ertong wanju zuotanhui de hanjian zuotanhui jilu ji
juxing ertong wanju zhanlanhui wenti xiang shifu de baogao ji qi youguan cailiao,”
Beijing Municipal Archives, ﬁle 22-12-896, 1950–1952; Zhou Shufen, “Zenyang wei
haizi xuanze wanju,” Xin Zhongguo funü 1 (1954), 31.
57 Yang Guang, “Meili de wanju,” Xiao pengyou 1045 (1952), 12–13; Xinhua she, “Zhou
zongli he re’ai kexue de xiao pengyou zai yiqi,” Xin shaonian bao 408 (1955), 1.
58 Feng Wenbin, “Shike zhunbei zhe,” in Zhongguo xin minzhuzhuyi qingnian tuan
Xinjiang sheng gongzuo weiyuanhui, ed., Zhongguo shaonian ertong dui shouce
(Dihua, 1952), 7–8.
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Children were expected to show support for the PLA’s efforts to
“liberate” Taiwan. They also had to be prepared to act, as did some
primary school pupils who reportedly trained to help the army by devising
makeshift parachutes with cloth doll dummies.59 Youngsters were also
supposed to develop a sound political awareness, in school and at home.
Methods for cultivating it included the use of recreational “teaching aids”
that primary school children could craft with their teachers. One such
teaching aid, named “Blast the War Criminal,” involved constructing
ﬁgurines of “war criminals” such as Chiang Kai-shek and Dwight
Eisenhower and then lighting ﬁrecrackers placed on their heads.60 Toy-
making manuals suggested that, to entertain themselves, children draw
“the common enemy of the Chinese people, wretched Chiang” with the
body of a dog, as he was “the running dog of American imperialism,” and
then shoot him with bamboo arrows tipped with suction cups.61
Patriotic education also involved participation in the campaign “Resist
America, Aid Korea.” Primary school students could apparently acquire
a solid yet enjoyable anti-imperialist extracurricular education by fashion-
ing “highly interesting” games as “War Criminal Enters the Cofﬁn”:
Players threw balls at a ﬁgurine to try to topple it and make the “cofﬁn”
lid close over it.62 Or children could craft toy planes – as a poem in the
periodical Good Children suggested – to go ﬁrst to bomb the American
imperialists and then ﬂy on to Beijing to see Mao Zedong.63 Toy-making
could also involve a fruitful combination of political and scientiﬁc com-
petence. Optical illusions, manuals advised, could be investigated by
making a thaumatrope that showed a dagger – the people’s “peace-
protecting armed forces” – piercing a “US-armed Japanese warlord”
and the maneuvering hand of “an American warmonger” behind him.
To comprehend the principle of gravity, children could produce the
revamped, or rearmed, rendition of a tumbler toy in the shape of
a fearless soldier, ever standing to safeguard the people, the motherland,
and peace.64
59 Guo Lin, “Women shi zheyang peiyang ertong de chuangzaoxing de,” Renmin jiaoyu 2
(1950), 52.
60 Xu Linshou, Xiaoxue jiaoju zhizuo (Shanghai, 1953), 169.
61 XiongDafu and FuTianqi,Ziji zuowanju (Shanghai, 1953), 84–86. “Wretched Chiang,”
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Hardly any mention of these activities can be found in contemporary
accounts, although some children seem to have echoed the discourse of
mobilization. Primary school boys purportedly made toy riﬂes for tod-
dlers so that they could learn to protect the country as the Chinese
Volunteer Army did. Student groups who engaged in learning about
science and technology by crafting models out of scraps proudly reported
that had their “Liberation tank” artillery been real, it would have “killed
quite a few American devils.”65 Chinese boys played games such as
“Resist America, Aid Korea.” Even foreign boys living in China pretended
that their siblings were spies for Chiang Kai-shek and, together with their
Chinese playmates, attacked them with mudball “hand grenades.”
As before, children crafted toy weapons and played war without explicitly
attaching militant signiﬁcance to it.66 That is, they apparently were not
ﬁghting for peace in their play.
Antithetical as this may seem, icons of both war and peace coexisted in
prescribed leisure. Toy-making suggestions for children encompassed card-
board doves, and the periodical Women of New China alerted mothers to
the ideological correctness of peace dove puzzles.67 Revolving-horse lan-
terns, which youngsterswere encouraged to construct in order to learn about
the effect of heat on air, could be decoratedwith peace doves or images of the
Chinese Volunteer Army pursuing American soldiers.68 Education should
apparently promote patriotism and internationalism. Like the Soviet Union,
the “new China” and its children were striving for peace.69 Very seldom did
65 Liu Guanying, “You yiyi de liwu,” Xin shaonian bao 253 (1952), 3; Lin Fuqi, “Wode
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experts recommend supplying children with toy tanks or guns, and play-
things from socialist countries were extolled as nonviolent, as opposed to
American “warmongering” toys. Yet Chinese factories churned out toy
tanks and guns as well as peace doves, as peace-loving children in stories
were “provoked” to react against bullies who boasted about their American
toy bayonets.70 And the military was a constant presence. Beginning in
kindergarten, children were taught to love and emulate the army, which
was represented as compassionate and protective.71 Tanks appeared in
pictures that were used to decorate classrooms. Toy-making texts featured
sorghum stalk warships. Pedagogues still included artillery pieces among the
shapes suggested for assembling blocks.72 The conciliatory attitude thus
went hand in hand with reminders of the necessity of vigilance, indicative
of an undercurrent of insecurity. Children’s periodicals, too, reiterated that
lurkingwithout andwithinwere enemies – including imperialists, capitalists,
and Nationalists – who were eager to destabilize the new China and to
jeopardize world peace. Accordingly, permanent mobilization was
required.73
Leaving aside the point that doves (and even the army) can signify
militancy for peace, some of the assessments of playthings displayed at
a 1950 exhibition may help explain the seemingly incongruous coexis-
tence of doves and armaments because they illuminate how the difference
between war and resistance was constructed and perceived. Planes and
tanks laudably fostered an interest in science, according to one observer,
but they had the downside of “arous[ing] the idea of warfare” in the
young. At the same time, a ﬁgurine of a Japanese soldier was commended
for “arous[ing] the idea of resistance war.”74 Warfare was judged to be
bad, but wars of resistance were good even if they, too, entailed combat
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70
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and violence. Criticizing war does not necessarily amount to rejecting
confrontational mobilization, especially when it is associated with resis-
tance to perceived aggression. Moreover, war and violence can be legit-
imized and rationalized as just, be it to repel invaders, as was the case in
the Republican era, or for the sake of revolution or political goals, as in the
Communist era.75 The cohabitation of peace doves and antagonistic
leisure can thus be situated within the paradigm of resistance versus
war: Warmongers and criminals can be joyfully smashed by righteous
resisters armed to preserve peace.
conclusion
Taking children’s toys as “a silent signifying dialogue between them and
their nation,”76 this chapter has explored an aspect of the top-down part
of that dialogue, the impact of which is difﬁcult to determine becausemost
data on childhood tend to be “adult-generated or adult-controlled.”77
Sketchy impressions gathered from accounts suggest that children appro-
priated selectively from adults’ efforts to mobilize them. Yet, high-handed
as it may have been, the rhetoric of activismwas acting on, and responding
to, assumptions and urgencies (perceived humiliation, nationalism, belief
in education and malleability) that made it intelligible to children and
adults alike.
Whether in times of war or nominal peace, mobilization through
leisure did not necessarily imply outright belligerence. Rather, it encour-
aged patriotism, discipline, political and technical competence, physical
and moral strength, and determination: in other words, the capacity to
resist rather than attack. Mobilization was constructed as defensive:
It would save the nation from “extinction,” repel invaders, or protect
peace. Ludic ﬁerceness was legitimated and simultaneously downplayed
as just preservation and rightful opposition to real or perceived external
encroachment.
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Toys were sometimes called models or teaching aids. This might signify
a wish to legitimate playthings by disavowing the play element, perhaps
deemed frivolous when connected to grave national concerns. The name
change, in other words, might have been meant to alter the perception of
the object: You do not use triﬂes when playing for keeps. Alternatively, the
name rectiﬁcation might have signiﬁed a culture of imitation/emulation
whereby toys became in fact and in name the props for rehearsing adult
responsibilities. Conversely, calling war toys “defense toys” or expunging
themartial spirit in namewhile cultivating it in fact might suggest the wish
to downplay antagonism in favor of just resistance. The very concept of
the military toy is in fact complex. Toys that are not inherently military
(tangrams, revolving-horse lanterns) could be deployed to cultivate quasi-
belligerent attitudes. Indeed, as Brian Sutton-Smith points out, knowing
the context in which a plaything is used is key to identifying its effects.78
Calling war toys “educational,” as many experts did, was not necessarily
an oxymoron: If playthings were tools for instruction, and if the goal of
education was to produce useful people, a tool that conveyed military
knowledge – knowledge that could be applicable in a time of perceived
threat – could thus be educational.
The seemingly contradictory stances of cherishing children while
acquainting them with the battleﬁeld can, ﬁnally, be explained by refer-
ring to their role as national symbols. Ostensibly, the Republican and
Communist regimes both set great store by children’s wellbeing and
accorded them high status. In return, children were asked to perform
duties that included reciprocating the protection they received from the
state. Trained by “toys,” children were supposed to mobilize and struggle
to preserve the renewed personhood, and nationhood, that they owed to
the state.
78 Brian Sutton-Smith, Toys as Culture (New York, 1986), 11, 251.
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